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Peer-Induced Fairness in Games
By Teck-Hua Ho and Xuanming Su*
People exhibit peer-induced fairness concerns when they look to their peers as
a reference to evaluate their endowments. We analyze two independent ultimatum games played sequentially by a leader and two followers. With peerinduced fairness, the second follower is averse to receiving less than the first
follower. Using laboratory experimental data, we estimate that peer-induced
fairness between followers is two times stronger than distributional fairness
between leader and follower. Allowing for heterogeneity, we find that 50 percent of subjects are fairness-minded. We discuss how peer-induced fairness
might limit price discrimination, account for low variability in CEO compensation, and explain pattern bargaining. (JEL C72, D63 )
Standard theories in economics generate predictions of market behavior by invoking two
fundamental assumptions. First, agents are self-interested in that their utility function depends
only on their own material payoffs. Second, market behavior is at equilibrium so that no individual agent can achieve a higher payoff by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium. Recent
advances in behavioral economics relax both assumptions by allowing agents, for example, to
care about others’ payoffs and to make mistakes (see Matthew Rabin 1998; Colin F. Camerer,
George Loewenstein, and Rabin 2004; and Ho, Noah Lim, and Camerer 2006a, b, for comprehensive reviews). This paper focuses on the self-interested assumption and investigates how
social comparison may lead to fairness concerns between peers.
A simple and powerful way to demonstrate that people are not purely self-interested is to study the
so-called ultimatum game. In this game, a leader and a follower divide a fixed pie. The leader moves
first and offers a division of the pie to the follower. The follower can accept or reject. If the follower
accepts, the pie is distributed according to the proposal. If the follower rejects, both players earn
nothing. When players care only about their own material payoffs, the subgame perfect equilibrium
predicts that the leader should offer a small amount (e.g., a dime) to the follower and the follower
would accept (since a dime is strictly preferred to nothing). However, data from many experiments
(where subjects are motivated by substantial financial incentives) cast doubt on this sharp prediction.
Typically, there are almost no offers below 20 percent of the pie. A majority of offers are between 30
percent to 40 percent. Low offers are frequently rejected and the frequency of rejection increases as
the offer decreases. These findings are robust to stake size (Robert Slonim and Alvin E. Roth 1998),
persist with repeated trials (Roth et al. 1991), and prevail across diverse cultures (Joseph Henrich
2000; Henrich et al. 2001; Miguel Costa-Gomes and Klaus G. Zauner 2001).
Several solutions have been proposed to resolve this anomaly. These solutions modify a player’s
utility function by allowing it to depend on the payoffs of other players (for a review see Ernst
Fehr and Urst Fischbacher 2002). In the ultimatum example, each player’s utility function now
*
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depends on what both players receive. Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt (1999) propose the so-called
“inequity aversion” model in which a player has a disutility of receiving a payoff that is different
from those of the other players. The extent of disutility depends on the player’s relative payoff
position; players exhibit a stronger disutility from “being behind” than from “being ahead.” Gary
Charness and Rabin (2002) extend the inequity aversion model to incorporate reciprocity in the
utility function (see also Rabin 1993; Fehr and Simon Gachter 2000). This generalized utility
function allows players to reciprocate when others have been nice or mean toward them. Gary
Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000) propose the Equity-Reciprocity-Competition (ERC) model in
which each agent’s utility function depends on her absolute payoff as well as her relative share of
the total payoff. Under ERC, given an absolute payoff, an agent’s utility is maximized when her
share is equal to the average share. The models of fairness concerns above can be used to capture
situations in which agents’ social preferences depend on payoffs of other economic agents. We
call this distributional fairness concerns.
However, in many real-life situations, people are also driven by social comparison (Leon
Festinger 1954). That is, they have a drive to look to others who are in similar circumstances
(i.e., their peers) to evaluate their outcomes and judge whether they have been treated fairly. We
term this tendency peer-induced fairness concerns. Indeed, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) suggest that
the reference agent for fairness in their inequity aversion model can also come from an external source. Specifically, they wrote, “the determination of the relevant reference group and the
relevant reference outcome for a given class of individuals is ultimately an empirical question”
(821). Building on their insight, and allowing for different types of reference agent, we distinguish
between peer-induced fairness concerns (relative to one’s peers) and distributional fairness concerns (relative to other players in the game) and study them simultaneously. We posit that peerinduced fairness concerns can be more salient than distributional fairness concerns when agents
engage in social comparison. This is so because social comparison creates a powerful reference
point or benchmark for players to compare their well-being with that of their peer groups.
In this paper, we study peer-induced fairness in a social situation involving three economic
agents. There is one leader and two followers. The followers have a similar endowment and the
leader plays an ultimatum game with each follower in sequence. Each game involves the leader
making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to one of the followers. The two games are identical and independent in that the leader plays the same game with each follower and actions of one game have
no bearing on the material payoffs of the other game. However, in between the two games, the
second follower obtains an informative but imperfect public signal of the first offer, and uses this
signal to infer the first follower’s payoff. We analyze this social situation but allow all agents to
have distributional fairness concerns and the second follower to have also peer-induced fairness
concerns. Our model predicts that if subjects noisily best-respond, the second follower’s likelihood of accepting an offer decreases in the signal, suggesting that an identical offer can become
less attractive as the second follower’s belief of the first follower’s payoff increases. In addition,
the leader’s offer to the second follower is contingent on the signal. The higher the signal, the
more attractive the offer will be.
Let us consider three classes of examples of this game. First, consider a seller that interacts
with multiple buyers (e.g., a manufacturer and multiple retailers, a firm and multiple customers).
Each seller-buyer transaction is independent in that actions within a transaction do not influence material outcomes of other transactions. As distributional fairness would suggest, each
individual buyer may care about the seller’s payoff in their own respective transaction (in addition to her own material payoff). On the other hand, peer-induced fairness suggests that each
individual buyer may also care a lot about what other buyers receive in their interactions with the
same seller. For example, a customer cares about what other customers pay for the same product.
Similarly, a retailer cares about what contract terms other retailers receive from the same manu-
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facturer. A buyer will treat any unfavorable differences in price or contract terms as entirely
unfair. Second, consider a boss who hires multiple workers with the same skills and performing
the same tasks. Clearly, workers care about not only their own wages but also the wages of their
peer workers. In fact, bosses often pay their workers a similar wage despite substantial differences in productivity in order to avoid demoralizing less productive workers.1 Third, consider a
family with multiple children. Sibling rivalry is common and it frequently arises from parents
showing favoritism. Clearly, this phenomenon implies that each child’s utility function depends
also on other children’s payoffs.2
We test our model’s predictions experimentally by engaging subjects in two independent ultimatum games as described above. Using this setup, we find support for our model’s predictions.
The follower in the second ultimatum game rejects the offer more frequently as the obtained signal
increases. The leader’s offer is strategic in that she exploits the second follower when the signal is
low (even when she has made a good offer to the first follower) and concedes more when the signal
is high. In addition, we structurally estimate the model parameters using the data. The estimated
peer-induced fairness parameter is two times larger than the distributional fairness parameter, suggesting that the former is more salient in such social settings. We also incorporate heterogeneity in
subjects’ taste for fairness by using a latent-class approach. We allow for two different segments,
one that is purely self-interested and another that has distributional and peer-induced fairness concerns. Our estimation results suggest that about half the subjects are purely self-interested.
The concept of peer-induced fairness has wide economic implications. We briefly discuss three
applications in this paper. First, we show how peer-induced fairness can constrain a monopoly’s
ability to price discriminate. Without peer comparisons, the monopoly has complete freedom
to maximize profits in separate markets that have different economic characteristics. However,
when consumers are averse to paying more than their peers, the monopoly may have to narrow
price differentials across markets. Second, we show that peer-induced fairness can lead to wage
compression. In particular, we show that low variability in CEO compensation packages (see
Charles A. O’Reilly, Brian G. Main, and Graef S. Crystal 1988, for empirical evidence) is necessary in order to prevent dissatisfaction resulting from peer comparisons (i.e., with other CEOs).
Third, peer-induced fairness can explain the phenomenon of so-called “pattern bargaining” (see
Harold M. Levinson 1960; Robert C. Marshall and Antonio Merlo 2004). In many industries,
a centralized labor union may negotiate with multiple firms sequentially. Pattern bargaining
occurs when the union uses the agreement reached with the first firm as a reference to set the
pattern for all subsequent negotiations. Our model naturally explains this phenomenon by peerinduced fairness; any subsequent agreement cannot deviate too much from the outcome of the
first negotiation. Pattern bargaining can be problematic when the union and a sequential firm
select different reference benchmarks, because this difference can restrict the set of feasible
negotiation outcomes and lead to labor strikes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I formulates the basic model and presents
the main equilibrium results. Section II describes the experimental design and procedure. Section
III presents the experimental results and calibrates the basic model using the data. Section IV
generalizes the basic model by incorporating heterogeneity. Section V describes three economic
applications of peer-induced fairness. Section VI concludes.
1
George A. Akerlof and Janet Yellen (1990) show that if workers proportionately withdraw their effort because
of peer-induced fairness concerns, this behavioral tendency can cause unemployment. Similarly, Fehr, George
Kirchsteiger, and Arno Riedl (1993) show that sellers respond to higher prices from buyers by offering superior quality
products.
2
The sibling rivalry example does not fit our model setup exactly. While our model assumes that there are two
independent pies to be negotiated, the two pies in the sibling example may depend on each other. However, the general
notion of peer-induced fairness does apply here too.
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I. Basic Model

A. Model Setup
There are three players—one leader and two followers. The leader plays an identical ultimatum game with each of the followers in sequence. In each game, there is a fixed pie of size π to
be divided between the leader and one of the followers. The leader moves first and offers s1 to the
first follower. The first follower’s decision a1 can either be to accept (a1 = 1) or to reject (a1 = 0).
If a1 = 1, the leader receives π − s1 and the follower receives s1. Otherwise, both receive zero.
The second follower obtains a signal z = s1 + ε, where ε is a zero-mean random noise term with
an arbitrary distribution function F  (·) and density function f (·). Based on this signal, the second
follower makes inferences regarding the first offer, and these beliefs influence his decision to
accept or reject. The same signal z is observed by the leader before the second game begins.
Then, the leader makes an offer s2 to the second follower, possibly based on the signal z. Again,
the follower’s decision a2 can be either to accept (a2 = 1) or to reject (a2 = 0). If a2 = 1, the
leader receives π − s2 and the follower receives s2. Otherwise, both receive nothing. Note that
the leader receives material payoff in both games while each of the followers receives material
payoff in their respective game.
Let us define the agent’s utility functions. Consider the utility function of the first follower
UF1 (s1, a1). The follower’s utility function has two components. The first component is the agent’s
material payoff from the game and the second component reflects the first follower’s disutility
from receiving a payoff that is behind that of the leader. Hence, the second component captures
distributional fairness concerns:
(1) 	

s1 − δ max{0, (π − s1) − s1 },
UF1 (s1, a1) = e 	
0,

if a1 = 1,

if a1 = 0.

Here, δ is the parameter capturing the degree of aversion from being distributionally behind.3
The second follower’s utility function UF2 (s2, a2) is defined similarly, except that it contains an
additional component. This component arises from the second follower’s tendency of comparing
herself to a similar peer (i.e., the first follower) and reflects the disutility from being behind. Recall
that z = s1 + ε is the signal observed by the second follower and the leader. Using the signal z,
ˆ (z) = P (a1 = 1 | z) that the first offer is accepted
the second follower can infer the probability    p 
ˆ1(z) = E (s1 | z, a1 = 1). We
and the conditional expectation of what the first follower receives    s
ˆ1(z) to
will discuss the signal inference process in more detail later. For now, let us use   p 
 ˆ (z) and    s
denote these inferences. The second follower’s utility function is given next:
s2 − δ max{0, (π − s2 ) −s2 }
ˆ1 (z) − s2 }
(2) 	
UF2 (s2, a2 | z) = e	 − ρ   p
 ˆ (z) max{0,    s
	  0,

if a2 = 1,
if a2 = 0.

3
Our model can be extended to include an additional disutility term resulting from being ahead. This is in the spirit
of Charness and Rabin (2002) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999). For example, the first follower’s utility function can also
include the term
−δ′ max{0, s1 − (π − s1)}. However, in Table 4 below, additionally allowing for this parameter yields
  
the estimate δ
 ˆ′ = 0. Thus, distributional fairness concerns associated with being ahead are absent in our experimental
data. We chose to use the simplest possible model to demonstrate the existence of peer-induced fairness because it
makes the model more tractable and allows us to generate sharp predictions about subjects’ behavior.
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As before, the parameter δ reflects the second follower’s degree of aversion from being distributionally behind the leader. In addition, the parameter ρ represents the degree of aversion from
being behind in a social comparison with a peer.4 We define “peer” as a reference agent who
satisfies two conditions. First, the reference agent must play the same role or position in the
game (e.g., another follower). Second, the reference agent must face the same social situation
(e.g., both have accepted or both have rejected the offer). In general, the notion of a peer can
clearly go beyond these specific contexts. In a clever study using a panel-level dataset, Erzo F.
P. Luttmer (2005) shows that a person’s self-reported happiness decreases with an increase in
neighbors’ incomes. Clearly, the neighbors may not have the same employer or even occupation.
In our experimental setup, subjects interact anonymously and the task context becomes the only
relevant cue for determining who their peer is. Luttmer’s finding suggests that other social cues
such as geographical location and regular social interactions can be equally compelling as criteria for defining a peer.
Linking this definition of a peer to the utility function (I.2), there are two cases. The first is
ˆ (z) that the first
when the second follower accepts (a2 = 1). In this case, there is probability    p
follower has also accepted. The second follower treats the first follower as a peer and experiences a disutility when what she receives, s2, is behind what she believes the first follower has
received,   s
 ˆ1(z). The second case is when the second follower rejects (a2 = 0). In this case, the
first follower must also have rejected to qualify as a peer, and both followers get nothing. So the
second follower’s utility is zero.5
The leader receives material payoffs from both ultimatum games. In the second game, the
leader receives the utility UL,II (s2, a2 | z), given as
(3) 	

UL,II (s2, a2 | z) = e

π − s2 − δ max{0, s2 − (π − s2 )}, if a2 = 1,
0,
if a2 = 0.

Note that the leader’s utility in the second game depends on the signal z = s1 + ε, insofar as
the second follower’s decision rests upon it. In the first game, the leader receives the utility
UL,I  (s1, a1) as follows:
(4) 	

UL,I (s1, a1) = e

π − s1 − δ max{0, s1 − (π − s1)},
0,

if a1 = 1,
if a1 = 0.

The general model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) allows for fairness concerns between all possible pairs of players. Our model builds on their model by allowing two different kinds of fairness
4
The aversion of being behind is similar to the notion of loss aversion (Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 1979;
Camerer 2000). People have a negative transaction utility when receiving a payoff that is below a well-defined reference
point. Ronald Bosman and Frans van Winden (2002) show that a follower’s expectation of what she is likely to receive
serves as a reference point and can significantly influence her acceptance decision in a continuous version of an ultimatum game. The notion of loss aversion has also been applied to a business-to-business channel setting to show why
nonlinear pricing contracts may not work as well as the standard models would suggest, because these pricing contracts
yield a negative transaction utility (Lim and Ho 2007; and Ho and Juanjuan Zhang 2008).
5
It is possible that the second follower, when rejecting, may engage in social comparison with the first follower who
ˆ1 (z) from rejecting, since
ˆ (z)    s
has accepted. If this is true, the second follower will experience a negative utility of −η    p
ˆ (z) that the first follower has accepted and received   s
there is a probability    p
 ˆ1 (z). Here, we distinguish the parameter
η from our parameter ρ above, because the former involves social comparison with an agent in a different situation.
ˆ = 0. Also, a nested model restricting ρ = η is
Allowing for η in our structural model estimation yields an estimate    η
strongly rejected (χ2 = 108,  p < 0.01). Consequently, we did not include η in our model to simplify exposition.
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for different pairs of players. Specifically, we distinguish fairness concerns between the leader
and a follower from fairness concerns between two followers, and show that the latter can be
more significant when players engage in social comparison.
We can solve the game using the standard backward induction principle. In the second game,
the leader chooses s2 to maximize UL,II (s2, a2 | z). In the first game, the leader chooses s1 to maximize UL,I (s1, a1) + UL,II (s2, a2 | z).
ˆ1 (z)
ˆ (z) and    s
B. Second Follower’s Inferences,    p
The model assumes that the second follower has a prior belief about what the first offer is and
denotes the density and distribution of this prior by g(·) and G(·), respectively. We assume that
G(·) is normally distributed. The second follower has a noisy rational expectation in that G(·)
has a mean of s1 and a standard deviation of σ1. Given the signal z = s1 + ε, the second follower
forms a posterior belief of the first offer, with density h(·), given by
(5) 	

g(x) f  (z − x)
h(x | z) = _______________
  −∞
     .
 ∞    g(x) f  (z − x) dx
∫

The second follower anticipates that the first follower has an acceptance threshold A satisfying
UF1 (s1 = A, a1 = 1) = 0, so the first follower will accept all offers s1 ≥ A. Therefore, the second
ˆ (z) that the first follower has accepted is
follower’s inference of the probability    p

∫

∞

ˆ (z) =     h(x | z) dx.
(6) 	   
p
A

Similarly, the second follower’s inference of the first offer, conditional on acceptance, is given
by
∞
∫A    x h (x | z) dx
  ˆ
___________
 .
(7) 	 s1 (z) =   ∞
  
  
 A    h (x | z) dx
∫
We add an information inference process by the second follower for three reasons:
(i) This information inference process makes our model more realistic. In many real-life situations, the negotiation outcomes are kept confidential so as to avoid social comparison
(e.g., employees are told not to reveal their raises to their peers). By allowing for imperfect
information, we make our model applicable to more social settings.
(ii) By introducing a noisy signal, we allow the leader to change his behavior as a result of the
signal realization. Had the second follower perfectly known the first follower’s payoff, the
leader’s offers in the two games would have been the same in equilibrium. Hence, imperfect
information provides an extra degree of freedom to test the model. For instance, we later
show that the equilibrium second offer is always higher than the equilibrium first offer.
(iii) The game with imperfect information also allows us to separate two fundamentally different kinds of peer-induced fairness from the leader’s perspective. The leader may inherently want to treat both followers the same way (e.g., parents showing no favoritism among
their children).6 In contrast, the leader may care about treating the two followers the same
6
One can extend the basic model by allowing the leader to have an intrinsic preference for treating the two followers
identically. This can be accomplished by adding an extra term −β ( Z s1 − s2 Z ) to the leader’s utility function. However,
our experimental data indicate that the leader tends to choose the second offer based on the second follower’s inference
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way only to the extent that the second follower is averse to being behind. In the former,
the leader will divide the pie the same way in the two games, independent of the signal. If
the latter is true, the leader will, in fact, choose the second offer contingent on the second
follower’s belief of what the first follower has received (the higher the belief, the higher
the offer).
C. Equilibrium Analysis
We work backward to derive the equilibrium predictions. In the second game, the leader makes
an offer s2 to the second follower, who then decides whether to accept or reject it. Recall that the
signal of the first offer is z, and the utility function of the second follower is
(8) 	

UF2 (s2, a2 | z) =

s2 − δ max { 0, (π − s2 ) − s2 }
e − ρ    pˆ (z) max { 0,    sˆ1 (z) − s2 }
0,

if a2 = 1,
if a2 = 0.

Thus, the second follower accepts the offer s2 if and only if UF2 (s2, 1 | z) ≥ 0. The leader’s utility
function is
(9)

π − s2 − δ max { 0, s2 − (π − s2 )},
UL,II (s2, a2 | z) = e
0,

if a2 = 1,
if a2 = 0.

Since the leader’s utility UL,II (s2, 1 | z) always decreases in s2, the leader will want to choose the
smallest acceptable offer s2 satisfying UF2 (s2, 1 | z) ≥ 0. The following proposition characterizes
the optimal offer s*2.
Proposition 1: The leader’s optimal offer to the second follower s*2 , as a function of the folˆ1 (z), is
ˆ (z) and    s
lower’s inferences    p 
(10)

ˆ1 (z) _________
ˆ1 (z) _______
ˆ (z)    s
π δ + ρ   p
 ˆ (z)    s
ρ    p
π (1 + δ)
π δ  ,    _____________
______
ˆ1 (z)) = min emax e 
ˆ (z),    s
s*2 (     p
  
  
     f ,  
 
,
 
 f .
  
  
1 + 2δ
1 + 2 δ 1 + 2 δ + ρ p
 ˆ (z) 1 + ρ p
 ˆ (z)

Proof:
See Appendix.

Note that the optimal offer is the minimum of two terms: (i) max{(π δ)/(1 + 2 δ), (π δ +
ˆ1 (z))/(1 + 2 δ + ρ    p
ˆ1 (z))/(1 + ρ    p
ˆ (z)), (ρ   p
ˆ (z))}; and (ii) π  (1 + δ)/(1 + 2 δ). The first
ˆ (z)    s
 ˆ (z)    s
ρ    p
term yields the leader’s most preferred offer while satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint (i.e., it is the smallest offer that induces the second follower to accept). The second term
provides an upper bound of the second offer beyond which the leader will make a negative utility
(due to distributional fairness concerns). The first term is determined by taking the maximum of
three fractions. Note that the first fraction is independent of ρ and the third fraction is independent of δ. Consequently, the first/third fraction becomes relevant when distributional fairness/
of what the first follower has received, which may be different from the actual first offer. Such strategic behavior suggests that the leader does not have a strong intrinsic preference to treat the two followers the same way.
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peer-induced fairness is dominant. The second fraction comes into play when both kinds of fairness are of comparable magnitude.
Proposition 1 highlights that the equilibrium offer s*2 in the second game is nondecreasing
in the second follower’s inference   s
 ˆ1(z). In fact, when   s
 ˆ1(z) is sufficiently large, s*2 is strictly
  ˆ
increasing in  s1(z) in a piecewise linear manner. This provides a sharp prediction on the leader’s
behavior. If the second follower has peer-induced fairness concerns (i.e., ρ > 0) and the leader
strategically anticipates such preferences, the leader should make the offer contingent on the
ˆ1(z).
inference    s
In the first game, the leader makes the offer s1 to the first follower. Recall that the first follower’s utility function is
(11) 	

UF1 (s1, a1) = e

s1 − δ max{0, (π − s1) − s1},
0,

if a1 = 1,
if a1 = 0.

Therefore, the first follower accepts the offer s1 if and only if UF1 (s1, 1) ≥ 0, which can be shown
to be equivalent to s1 ≥ (π δ)/(1 + 2 δ). In other words, the first follower’s acceptance threshold
is A = (π δ)/(1 + 2 δ).
How much should the leader offer to the first follower? This decision influences the leader’s
material payoffs in both the first and the second games. Conditional on s1 in the first game and
along the equilibrium path in the second, the term UL,II (s2, a2 | z) can be written in terms of the
signal z as
(12) 	

U *L,II (z) = UL,II (s*2 (z), a*2 (z) | z).

Since the signal z = s1 + ε, the expected value of the utility above given a first offer s1 is
(13) 	

∫

∞

EU *L,II (s1) =     U *L,II (s1 + ε) dF (ε).
−∞

Therefore, the leader chooses the first offer s1 to maximize UL,I (s1, a1) + EU *L,II (s1). The following lemma states the relationship between the first offer s1 and the leader’s total expected utility
in the second game, along the equilibrium path.
Lemma 2: Condition on s1 and along the equilibrium path, the leader’s total expected utility
in the second game, EU *L,II (s1), is decreasing in s1.
Proof:
See Appendix.
The above lemma suggests that the leader incurs two costs in making a high offer, s1. First, a
high s1 will lower the leader’s material payoffs in the first game. Second, this same high offer also
leads to a lower expected utility for the leader in the second game. This is because a high s1 sets a
high reference point for social comparison by the second follower, and this peer-induced fairness
effect forces the leader to make a more generous offer, s2. Consequently, the leader will make the
smallest possible offer, s1,in the first game. This offer is, however, constrained by the first follower’s distributional fairness concerns. The following proposition states this result formally.
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Proposition 3: The leader’s optimal offer to the first follower s*1 is
(14) 	

s*1 = ______
  π δ   .
1 + 2δ

Proof:
See Appendix.
As a consequence of Proposition 3, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 4: Under all signal realizations, the leader always gives a higher offer (weakly)
to the second follower, i.e., s*2 ≥ s*1 .
Proof:
See Appendix.
Let us consider a numerical example. Let δ = 0.5, ρ = 1.5, and π = 100. Assume that the noise
term ε is uniformly distributed over {−20, −10, 0, 10, 20} and the second follower’s prior belief of
the first offer is normally distributed with mean s*1 and variance σ1 = 20.7 With these parameters,
the equilibrium first offer is s*1 = 25. Given the offer, the first follower will accept (i.e., a*1 = 1).
The possible signal values are {5, 15, 25, 35, 45}. The equilibrium second offers conditional on the
signal are given in Table 1.
The second follower always accepts the offer at equilibrium. In this example, note the following about the relationship between the second offer and the signal:
(i)	The second offer, s*2  , is nondecreasing in the signal. At the highest possible signal, the
offer is about 20 percent above the first offer, s*1  ;
(ii)	The second offer, s*2  , is always greater than the first offer, s*1 = 25, a constraint imposed
by distributional fairness concerns. This result suggests that the leader is more generous
to the second follower.
D. A Variant with Simultaneous Offers
In this subsection, we consider a simultaneous analog of the model. As before, the leader has
two separate pies to divide, each with a separate follower. However, the difference is that the
leader now makes offers to both followers simultaneously. The game begins with the leader making offers si to follower i = 1, 2. Each follower i may accept the offer (ai = 1) or reject it (ai = 0).
If ai = 1, the leader receives π − si and follower i receives si  ; otherwise, both receive zero from
the corresponding pie. Note that each follower’s acceptance decision influences only the division
of one of the two pies.8
Consistent with the earlier setup, each follower’s offer is privately observed, but there is a signal inference process before the followers make their decision. Let Δ = s2 − s1 denote the true
difference between the two offers (which is known to the leader but not to either follower). Both
followers observe a public signal of this difference, z = Δ + ε, where ε is a zero-mean random
noise term with distribution F (·). Like before, the followers have noisy rational expectations.
7

We chose these parameters and assumptions because they are close to our structural estimates and experimental
setup described below.
8
This is different from Fehr and Schmidt (1999), who consider multiple receivers responding to offers on the same
pie.
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Table 1—Equilibrium Second Offers in a Numerical Example
Signal (z)

Equilibrium second offer (s2*)

5
15
25
35
45

25
26.30
27.69
28.96
30.25

Each follower’s prior belief G (·) over the difference Δ is normally distributed with mean Δ and
standard deviation σ. After each follower i observes the signal z and her own offer si, each follower forms a posterior belief over the other offer. Specifically, letting m(z) ≡ E [ Δ | z], follower
1’s posterior expectation is E[ s2 | z, s1 ] = s1 + m(z), while follower 2’s posterior expectation is
E[s1 | z, s2] = s2 − m(z). Observe that m(z) is the followers’ common posterior belief of the difference between the two offers. When m(z) > 0, both followers believe that the leader has made a
higher offer to follower 2, and vice versa.
Based on the signal z, each follower chooses whether to accept or reject. Let us first focus on
follower 1. Follower 1’s utility is
s1 − δ max { 0, π − 2s1 } − ρ max { 0, m(z)}
from accepting the offer, and zero from rejecting it. Given the offer
__

__

δ π + ρ m 
 1
s1 =   ________
 
1 + 2δ

__

__

for some m 
 1 > 0, follower 1 will accept it as long as m(z) ≤ m 1. In other words, the threshold m 1
represents the largest unfavorable disparity in payoffs that follower 1 is willing to tolerate.
__
Therefore, the offer s1 will be accepted with probability P { m(z) ≤ m 1 }. Now, let us turn to follower 2, whose utility is
s2 − δ max { 0, π − 2s2 } − ρ max { 0, − m(z)}
from accepting, and zero from rejecting. As above, if given the offer
__

__

δ π + ρ m 
 2
s2 = ________
 
 
1 + 2δ

__

for some m 
 2 > 0, follower 2 will accept it whenever m(z) ≥ −m 2, which occurs with probability
__
P { m(z) ≥ − m 
 2 }.
Anticipating the followers’ response, the leader chooses the optimal offers s*1, s*2 to maximize
expected payoff given by
__

__

(π − s1) P { m(z) ≤ m 1 } + (π − s2 ) P { m(z) ≥ − m 2 } .
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In equilibrium, there are three possible scenarios, depending on the signal realization z. When
__
__
__
m(z) < − m 
 , only follower 1 accepts. When − m 
 2 ≤ m(z) ≤  m 1, both offers are accepted. When
__ 2
m(z) > m 
 1, only follower 2 accepts.
We experimentally test the sequential game rather than the simultaneous game for three reasons. First, the sequential game is probably more common in practice (e.g., pattern bargaining).
Second, the sequential setup is richer for model estimation. Since the leader observes the signal
realization before making the second offer, she can choose the second offer based on the signal.
Third, the sequential game allows us to separate whether the leader herself genuinely cares about
treating the followers the same way or if she strategically responds to followers having peerinduced fairness. If the former is true, s*2 = s*1. If the latter is true, s*2 > s*1.
II. Experimental Procedure

Seventy-five undergraduate students at a western university participated in the experiment.9
There were four experimental sessions. Each session had between 15 and 21 subjects and always
consisted of 24 decision rounds. Each subject played the game 24 times. The matching protocol
was such that subjects were randomly matched with others in each round and they never knew
the identities of other players. Each session lasted for one and a half hours. Subjects were paid
a show-up fee of $5 for arriving on time and earned an average payment of about $19. Before
the experiment began, subjects were read the instructions aloud and were given a chance to ask
questions in private. A copy of the instructions is given in Appendix B. The entire experiment
was computerized to facilitate information passing and random matching.
We simplified the decision task as much as possible. For example, the instructions provided a
table that shows the possible first offers corresponding to a given signal value. The anonymous
subject matching procedure was intended to avoid communication between subjects. Since a
random matching protocol is used in each round, we controlled for collusion, reciprocity, and
reputation-building behaviors. Therefore, each round could be framed as a one-shot game with
new partners. In each round, subjects were randomly grouped in triplets. In each triplet, the
three subjects were randomly assigned the roles of RED (leader), BLUE1 (the first follower),
or BLUE2 (the second follower).10 The three players played two independent ultimatum games,
each with a pie size of 100 points, in sequence.
RED and BLUE1 played Game I first. RED moved first and chose the first offer s1 (an integer
between 0 and 100) at which she wished to divide the pie between herself and the first follower.
The computer routed the information on s1 to BLUE1. BLUE1 then decided whether to accept the
offer. If BLUE1 chose to accept, RED and BLUE1 received the allocated amount accordingly. If
BLUE1 rejected, both players earned zero points.
To construct the signal z, we drew a number from a discrete uniform distribution over the set
{−20, −10, 0, 10, 20} and added it to the first offer. Consequently, given a signal z, the subjects
could infer what the first follower is likely to receive. To measure   s
 ˆ1(z), we asked BLUE2 to make

It is common to use undergraduates to test theories of industrial organization (see Charles A. Holt 1995). The
results could, in principle, be replicated with managers. Several previous studies comparing professionals and students
find little difference between the two groups (see Charles R. Plott 1987; Sheryl B. Ball and Paula-Ann Cech 1996).
Alternatively, one could use student subjects with different levels of experience with the task to assess whether experts
behave differently from novices (e.g., Yun J. Jung, John H. Kagel, and Dan Levin 1994).
10
We chose a role-switching design for two reasons. First, this design makes the average payoff of each subject similar (since every subject has an equal chance to be the leader). Second, we believe that such a design increases subjects’
understanding of the game and hence reduces noise in the data.
9
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Table 2—The Distribution of Offers and the Rates of Rejection
Game I
Offer range
> 50
50
45–49.5
40–44.5
35–39.5
30–34.5
25–29.5
20–24.5
15–19.5
10–14.5
< 10
All

Game II

Offers (percent)

Rejected (percent)

Offers (percent)

Rejected (percent)

598 (100.0)

73 (12.2)

598 (100.0)

72 (12.0)

29   (4.8)
35   (5.9)
14   (2.3)
109 (18.2)
93 (15.6)
140 (23.4)
58   (9.7)
77 (12.9)
22   (3.7)
14   (2.3)
   7   (1.2)

0   (0)
0   (0)
0   (0)
1   (0.9)
6   (6.5)
15 (10.7)
15 (25.9)
15 (19.5)
8 (36.4)
7 (50.0)
6 (85.7)

28   (4.7)
35   (5.9)
24   (4.0)
116 (19.4)
75 (12.5)
149 (24.9)
63 (10.5)
74 (12.4)
14   (2.3)
17   (2.8)
   3   (0.5)

0   (0)
2   (5.7)
0   (0)
2   (1.7)
5   (6.7)
13   (8.7)
20 (31.7)
11 (14.9)
6 (42.9)
11 (64.7)
2 (66.7)

a guess of what the first offer was and rewarded the player a modest sum of ten points for making
a correct guess.11
Finally, RED and BLUE2 played Game II. RED moved first and made an offer s2 to BLUE2.
BLUE2 could either accept or reject. If BLUE2 chose to accept, both players received payoffs as
allocated. Otherwise, both received nothing. The outcomes, including whether BLUE2 guessed
correctly, were revealed only at the end of each decision round comprising of both Games I and
II. Each BLUE player received only the outcomes of her own game.
Each player’s total point earnings for a decision round were recorded. Note that the leader
received point earnings from both Games I and II. At the end of the session, point earnings for
all rounds were summed up and redeemed for cash payment at the rate of $0.01 per point (i.e.,
each ultimatum game involved dividing a pie of $1).
III. Estimation

A. Basic Results
Table 2 shows the basic results. Note that few offers are above 50 percent of the pie. Across the
two games, less than 5 percent of the offers are within this range. The modal offer is between 30
percent and 35 percent for both games. Few offers are below 15 percent of the pie. No more than
3.5 percent of the offers fall into this range across the games. Hence, the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction of a very low offer is strongly rejected. There is a clear pattern of a higher rate
of rejection as the offer decreases. For example, there is no single offer in the range of 45 percent
to 50 percent that was rejected, while the rate of rejection ranges from 25.9 percent to 31.7 percent when the offers are within the range of 25 percent to 30 percent. The overall results suggest
that subjects are not purely self-interested. In general, our results are comparable to those of prior

11
One of the reviewers remarked that the belief elicitation procedure itself could have changed the second follower’s
acceptance decision. To test for this conjecture, subjects in one session were not asked to guess the first offer before
their acceptance decision. We analyzed subjects’ decisions in this session separately and found the structural estimates
from this session to be similar to those of the other three sessions. Consequently, we pool all the data in our structural
estimation below.
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studies, except that the offers are slightly lower and followers tend to reject less frequently. The
four experimental sessions produced 600 observations. There were two observations for which
the leader made an offer of 100 (the entire pie) in either Game I or Game II. These data points
were removed as outliers, so our dataset has a sample size of N = 598.
We tested the data for time trends in the leader’s offers as well as the followers’ acceptance
decisions. For the offers si, we specified the model si (t ) = κ 0 + κ1 t. Here, si (t ) denotes the leader’s i-th offer (i = 1 or 2) in the t-th decision round, averaged over all subjects in the same session. In this model, κ1 captures any possible time trend. Similarly, for the acceptance decisions
ai, we fitted the logistic regression P(ai(t) = 1) = (e κ 0+κ1t )/(1 + e κ 0+κ1t  ). We found no significant
time trends (i.e., κ1 is not statistically different from zero) for either acceptance decisions or the
second offer. For the first offer, there was no time trend beyond round 2. All our results (e.g.,
parameter estimates) remain unchanged whether we include the first two rounds of data or not.
In the following analysis, we assume no time trend.
B. Does Peer-Induced Fairness Exist?
The central hypothesis of this paper is that the second follower has peer-induced fairness concerns. The second follower’s utility function (equation (2)) implies that, all things being equal,
the second follower receives a lower utility if she believes she is behind the first follower. If the
second follower makes decision errors (i.e., quantal-respond instead of best-respond), the second
follower is less likely to accept an offer if the difference between   s
 ˆ1(z) and the offer s2 is high.12
Table 3 below shows how the rate of rejection varies depending on whether the second follower
believes she is ahead (s2 −   s
 ˆ1(z) > 0), on par (s2 −   s
 ˆ1(z) = 0), or behind (s2 −   s
 ˆ1(z) < 0).
The results are clear: the second follower rejects a lot more frequently when she is behind than
otherwise (23.5 percent versus 4 percent). We test this formally by running a random effects
logistic regression with BLUE2’s decision a2 against the second offer s2 and how much it differs
from BLUE2’s guess (which is an estimate for   s
 ˆ1 (z)). Let superscripts i and t denote subject and
decision round, and let x+ = max { x, 0 }. Formally, we have
(15) 	

ˆ1  i t(z  it ) − sit2    )+}
exp {γ  0i + γ 1 s  2it  + γ 2 (   s
P(a2it  = 1) =  _____________________________
    
    
  ,
ˆ  1it (z it  ) − sit2    )+ }
1 + exp {γ  0i + γ 1 s  2it + γ 2 (   s

where γ  0i are subject-specific random effects. If BLUE2 has peer-induced preferences, we would
ˆ 2 = −0.024 (   p-value = 0.05). This
expect γ 2 to be negative. The estimation result shows that     
γ
result suggests that the second follower may indeed be reluctant to accept an offer that is inferior
to that of a peer.13 This finding also casts some doubt on the self-interested assumption and theories that ignore peer-induced fairness concerns.

12
It is interesting to check whether the second follower’s inference   s
 ˆ1(z) is accurate. We regress the second follower’s
ˆ1(z) = ω 0 + ω1 a1s1. The best fitted
guess against the actual amount received by the first follower. Formally, we have    s
ˆ 1 = 0.26 (  p-value = 4.1 × 10−10  ). This suggests
regression line yields    
ω
 ˆ 0 = 25.4 percent (p-value < 1 × 10−16   ) and     
ω
that the second follower’s inference is aligned with the first offer but exhibits some biases. They tend to overestimate
the first offer when it is less than 34 percent and underestimate it when it is above 34 percent.
13
Upon a reviewer’s suggestion, we also test for the existence of peer-induced fairness by manipulating the notion of
a peer systematically. We ran a control session by making the first follower no longer a peer for the second follower. We
used the same sequential game setup, except that we manipulated the degree of similarity of the followers’ situations by
using a random device to determine the leader’s offer to the first follower so that the second follower perceived the first
offer to be incomparable to the second offer. Our results reveal that the second follower’s decision becomes independent
ˆ 2 = 0.024 (   p-value
of first follower’s payoff and there is indeed no peer-induced fairness effect in the control session:     
γ
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Table 3—Different Rates of Rejection when Follower 2 is Ahead or Behind
Being ahead (s2 −   s
 ˆ1(z) > 0)
N

On par (s2 −   s
 ˆ1(z) = 0)

Being behind (s2 −   s
 ˆ1(z) < 0)

Number of rejections

N

Number of rejections

N

Number of rejections

6 (3.6 percent)

110

5 (4.5 percent)

179

42 (23.5 percent)

165

It is possible that the first follower may also exhibit peer-induced fairness. The first follower
may look ahead and anticipate what the second follower will receive in the future. If this is true,
the first follower’s expectation may influence her decision to accept. We check this conjecture by
running a random effects logistic regression with BLUE1’s decision a1 against the first offer s1
and how much it differs from the (anticipated) second offer s2. Here, we assume that BLUE1 is
able to predict the second offer perfectly. Formally, we have
(16) 	

exp{γ   0i  + γ 1 s  1it + γ 2 (s  2it − s  1it   )+ }
P(ait1  = 1) =  ________________________
    
      ,
1 + exp{γ  0i  + γ 1 s   1it + γ 2 (s  2it − s  1it   )+ }

where γ   0i   captures random effects. Like before, we would expect γ 2 to be negative and statistiˆ 2 = −0.01 < 0, p-value
cally different from zero. Our result indicates otherwise (the estimated     
γ
= 0.58).
C. Did the Leader Respond to Peer-Induced Fairness?
Proposition 1 suggests that the leader’s offer in Game II is nondecreasing in   s
 ˆ1(z). Indeed, it is
piecewise linear in   s
 ˆ1(z) if the latter is sufficiently high. Figure 1 shows the observed frequencies
of the difference between the second offer and the guess, i.e., (s2 −   s
 ˆ1(z)). Note that this difference centers around zero and drops quickly as the difference gets larger, suggesting that the offer
may be influenced by the guess.
ˆ1(z). Formally, we have
A simple test for this prediction is to regress s2 against    s
ˆ   1it (z  it    ),
(17) 	s  2it = α    i0  + α1    s
where α    i0  are random effects. If the prediction is right, we expect α1 to be positive. The regresˆ 1 =0.09 and p-value
sion results suggest that α1 is indeed positive and statistically significant (    
α
= 3.5 × 10−3  ). This result implies that the leader is strategic and aligns her second offer with the
ˆ1(z). As the second follower’s inference increases, the leader who
second follower’s inference    s
accounts for peer-induced fairness also strategically raises the second offer.
Furthermore, Corollary 4 suggests that by responding to peer-induced fairness concerns, the
leader tends to be more generous to the second follower (i.e., s2* > s1*). We test this prediction
using two methods. First, we treat each game outcome involving each triplet in a round as an
independent observation. We perform a Wilcoxon signed-rank test with the null hypothesis that
the medians of the distributions of the first and second offers are equal against the alternative
hypothesis that the second is greater than the first. We use a one-sided test. There were n = 295
= 0.41). This finding shows that when the second follower does not perceive the first follower as a peer, the former does
not exhibit peer-induced fairness concerns.
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Figure 1. Observed Frequencies of the Difference between the Second Offer
and the Guess

observations for which the two offers were different. Under the null,
the test statistic W (sum of
_______________
signed ranks) is normal with mean zero and standard deviation  √(n(n + 1)(2n +   
1))/6  = 2,933.
We obtain W = 5,295 (  p-value = 0.03), and thus we can reject the null hypothesis. In the second
method, we treat each subject’s average offer across rounds as an independent observation. So,
for each of the 75 subjects, we compute the average first offer and average second offer (across
rounds). We then performed the one-tailed Wilcoxon test as before. The corresponding p-value
is 0.04, and thus we can again reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we conclude that the second
offer is indeed more generous (marginally) than the first offer.
D. Parameter Estimation
To formally estimate the relative importance of peer-induced and distributional fairness concerns, we structurally estimate the model parameters. The proposed model has two parameters,
δ and ρ. The model involves four decisions, s1, s2, a1, and a2. We assume normal error terms ξ1, ξ2
for the leader’s decisions,
(18) 	

s1 = s1* + ξ1,

(19) 	

s2 = s2* + ξ2,
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Table 4—Estimation Results
Parameter
δ
ρ
λ1
λ2
σ1
σ2
log likelihood

No fairness

Distributional fairness only

Full model

—
—
13.730
14.139
35.131
35.017

0.597
—
17.094
16.688
13.590
12.895

0.501
1.746
12.653
24.702
14.924
11.082

−6,327.1

−5,408.5

−5,354.5

so s1 and s2 have normal density φ1(·), φ 2 (·) with means of s1* and s2* and variances of σ  12 and σ  22 ,
respectively. The followers’ utilities have an extreme value error term so that their acceptance
probability has a logistic form with parameters λ1 and λ 2 given below:
(20)

UF1 (δ)/λ1

P1(δ, λ1) = _________
  e  U (δ)/λ
   ,
F1
1
1 + e 


(21)

UF2 (δ, ρ)/λ 2

P2 (δ, ρ, λ 2) = __________
  e  U (δ, ρ)/λ
    .
2
1 + e  F2


In summary, the likelihood function for a set of decisions s1, s2, a1, and a2 is
(22) 	

φ1(s1) φ 2 (s2) (P1) a1 (1 − P1) (1−a1) (P2) a2 (1 − P2) (1−a2),

which we maximize over the parameters δ, ρ, σ1, σ 2, λ1, λ 2.
Table 4 shows the estimation results. We estimate the full model and two nested models. The
first column presents the nested model without any fairness concerns (i.e., δ = ρ = 0 or agents are
purely self-interested). The second column gives the results when players have only distributional
fairness concerns (i.e., ρ = 0). The third column presents the full model. Both nested models
are strongly rejected when compared to the full model, indicating that subjects care about both
distributional and peer-induced fairness. The self-interested hypothesis is clearly rejected (χ2
= 1,963.2, p-value < 1.0 × 10−16  ). The nested model where the second follower has only distributional fairness is also strongly rejected (χ2 = 108.0, p-value < 1.0 × 10−16  ), suggesting that
the second follower clearly has peer-induced fairness concerns. In the full model, the estimated
peer-induced fairness  parameter is ρ
    ˆ = 1.746, which is larger than the estimated distributional
ˆ
fairness parameter of δ
  = 0.501. Given these parameter estimates and the logit specification in
(21), the second follower’s probability of rejection increases by 0.5 percent as her material payoff lags behind the leader’s by one additional point (out of π = 100). Analogously, the second
follower’s probability of rejection increases by 1.8 percent when her expected payoff difference
behind the first follower increases by one point. These results suggest that peer-induced fairness
(between followers) weighs more heavily than distributional fairness (between the leader and a
follower) in the second follower’s behavior.
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IV. Incorporating Heterogeneity

Our basic model adopts a representative-agent approach and assumes that all players have
identical fairness concerns. In this section, we incorporate heterogeneity by analyzing a twosegment model in which one segment is purely self-interested and the other segment has both
distributional and peer-induced fairness concerns. This extension is useful because a fraction of
players is likely to be purely self-interested and we can then determine how self-interested players’ behaviors are influenced by the existence of fairness-minded players.
In the two-segment model, let θ denote the fraction of the self-interested segment (i.e., the segment that has ρ = δ = 0). The remaining segment has distributional and peer-induced fairness
concerns, represented by the parameters δ and ρ, as before. We shall derive the subgame perfect
equilibrium using backward induction. The next proposition characterizes the leader’s optimal
offer s2* in the second game. The key observation is that the leader may either make the same
offer characterized in Proposition 1 (which induces both types to accept) or simply offer zero (in
which case only the purely self-interested followers will accept). The former is preferred when
the fraction of fairness-minded players is sufficiently large (i.e., θ sufficiently small).
ˆ1(z). Denote
Proposition 5: Suppose the follower’s inference is    s
ˆ1(z) _________
ˆ1(z) _______
ˆ (z)    s
π δ + ρ   p
 ˆ (z)    s
ρ    p
π (1 + δ)
π δ  , ____________
______
˜2 = min emax e 
(23)	   s
 
  
  
   f ,  

,
 
 f .
  
  
1 + 2δ
1 + 2 δ 1 + 2 δ + ρ p
 ˆ (z) 1 + ρ p
 ˆ (z)
The leader’s optimal offer to the second follower is
  
˜2 − π } ≥ θ π,
˜2, if π −   s
s
 ˜2 − δ max { 0, 2   s
	 
(24)
s2* = e
  
  
˜2 − δ max { 0, 2 s
˜2 − π } < θ π.
0, if π −  s

Proof:
See Appendix.
Next, consider the first game when there are both self-interested and fair-minded types.
Similarly as above, the leader faces a choice between making the minimum acceptable offer to
induce the fair-minded types to accept, and offering zero (in which case only the self-interested
types will accept). As the next proposition shows, the former is preferred when the fraction of selfinterested types θ is sufficiently small. The cutoff value for θ can be calculated numerically.
  
Proposition 6: There exists some cutoff θ
 ˜ ∈ [0, 1] such that the leader’s optimal offer to the
first follower is

(25)
Proof:
See Appendix.

s1*

=e

______
  π δ   ,
1 + 2δ
0,

  
if θ ≤ θ
 ˜,

  
if θ > θ
 ˜.
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Table 5—Estimation Results for Model Extensions
Parameter
δ
ρ
λ1
λ2
σ1
σ2
θ

Full model (one segment)

Full model (two segments)

0.501
1.746
12.653
24.702
14.924
11.082
—

0.771
1.619
9.941
10.033
10.410
10.821
0.503

−5,354.5

−4,990.0

LL

We structurally estimate this two-segment model using the experimental data.14 This task helps
to determine the fraction of the purely self-interested segment θ. Table 5 shows the estimation
results. The first column, for convenience, replicates the estimation results of the one-segment
model, while the second column adds one additional parameter that represents the size of the
purely self-interested segment (θ ).
These results strongly suggest that there is substantial heterogeneity in subjects’ preferences for
fairness. About 50 percent of the subjects are estimated to be purely self-interested. Consequently,
the representative-agent assumption is strongly rejected (χ2 = 729.0, p-value <
1.0 × 10−16).
   ˆ
Furthermore, observe that the model estimates for the fair-minded segment are  δ = 0.771 and ρ
    ˆ
=1.619. Note that the degree of aversion to being behind a peer (ρ) is two times stronger than the
degree of aversion to being distributionally behind (δ). Given these parameter estimates, within
the fair-minded segment, the second follower’s probability of rejection increases by 1.9 percent
(4.0 percent) as her material payoff lags behind the leader’s (respectively, the first follower’s) by
one additional point. As before, these results suggest that peer-induced fairness concerns influence the second follower’s actions more heavily than distributional fairness concerns.
V. Economic Applications of Peer-Induced Fairness

Many economic models can be substantially enriched by incorporating peer-induced fairness. In this section, we sketch three simple applications in which peer-induced fairness plays
an important role. Specifically, we show how peer-induced fairness alone (without distributional

Formally, we express the likelihood function for the data as follows. Let (s  1it , s  2it , a  1it , a  2it   ) be the decisions made
by subject i in decision round t. Let T  Li,  TF1
    i ,  TF2
  i  denote the sets of decision rounds during which subject i is the leader,
follower 1, and follower 2, respectively. Given the model parameters θ, δ, ρ, σ 1, σ 2, λ1, λ 2, the likelihood function for
our data is
14

(26) 	∏  cθ a  ∏  φ01 (  s  1it    ) φ02 (  s  2it   ) ∏  (P10   ) a1 (1 − P  10   ) (1−a1   ) ∏   (P20 ) a2 (1 − P20  ) (1−a2  )b
  it

i

it

t∈TF1
  i  

t∈T  Li 

  it  

  it

  i
t∈TF2
 

+ (1 − θ) a  ∏  φ1(s  1i t  ) φ 2 (s  2i t  )  ∏  (P1) a1  (1 − P1) (1−a1    ) ∏  (P2) a2  (1−P2) (1−a2   )b d ,
  it

t∈T  Li 

t∈TF1
  i  

  it

  it

t∈TF2
  i  

  it

where φ1, φ 2, P1, and P2 are given as in (18) to (21), and φ01 ,  φ02,  P  10 , and P  20 are defined similarly, but with δ = ρ = 0.
The expression in each pair of parentheses above represents the likelihood of observing subject i’s decisions, given that
subject i is of a particular type (i.e., either self-interested or fair-minded) across all relevant decision rounds. In our
structural estimation, we maximize the likelihood function (26) over the parameters θ, δ, ρ, σ 1, σ 2, λ1, λ 2.
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fairness) can limit the degree of price discrimination, account for low variability in CEO compensation, and lead to the occurrence of labor strikes.
A. Price Discrimination
Many firms charge the same price in different markets, even though the opportunity for price
discrimination exists. Peer-induced fairness provides a plausible rational explanation for this
phenomenon. Consider a monopoly selling in two separate markets i = L, H. Suppose that the
demand function for each market is linear, with Di(    pi) = Ai − pi for i = L, H. Equivalently, we
can think of each market as a mass of Ai consumers, whose valuations are uniformly distributed
between 0 and Ai. Let AL < AH. In other words, we can think of Market L as the low-value market and Market H as the high-value market. The marginal production cost for both markets is
denoted c. By the standard textbook analysis, we can calculate the monopoly’s profit-maximizing
price in each market to be pi* = (Ai + c)/2. Under this result, the monopolist charges a higher
price in the high-value market than in the low-value market.
Now, suppose that consumers have peer-induced fairness concerns. Similar to our model setup,
assume that the monopolist enters the two markets sequentially. In this case, consumers in the
late market will be averse to paying a higher price compared to consumers in the early market.
Which market should the monopolist target first?
Consider first the case where the monopolist enters the high-value market before moving to the
low-value market. Note that the profit-maximizing prices remain unchanged at pi* = (Ai + c)/2.
This is because the price p*H for the high-value market sets a high reference point for social comparison. Consequently, consumers in the low-value market who face a lower price p*L will not be
affected by peer-induced fairness concerns.
However, the analysis changes dramatically when the monopolist first enters the low-value
market. This initial price for the low-value market sets a reference point for consumers in the
high-value market.15 When a consumer from the high-value market with valuation v pays price
pH for the product and the earlier price set for the low-value market is pL , the consumer receives
utility v − pH − ρ ( pH − pL ). Therefore, only consumers with valuations at least pH + ρ( pH − pL )
are willing to buy. In other words, peer-induced fairness makes it more costly for the monopolist
to raise prices in the high-value market beyond that in the low-value market. It can then be shown
that with peer-induced fairness concerns, the optimal prices satisfy (AL + c)/2 < p*L ≤ p*H <
(AH + c)/2. Specifically, when ρ is small enough, we have
(27) 	

(28) 	

15

ρ AH
    a _____
  − cb  
AL + c + __
2 1+ρ
AL + c
p*L =  ___________________
    
   >  _____
  ,
 
2
2
ρ
2 −  _______
2(1 + ρ)

p*H

AH + ρ p*L
 ________
  + c
1+ρ
AH + c
=  ___________
   <  ______
 
 .
2
2

There are three possible market entry scenarios. The firm can either enter both markets simultaneously, enter the
low-value market first, or enter the high-value market first. The analysis applies to the first two scenarios. It also applies
to the third scenario if we allow consumers who make early purchases to look ahead and make social comparison with
consumers who make late purchases.
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However, when ρ is sufficiently large, the monopolist prefers to eliminate
price discrimination
__
* = p* = (  A + c)/2 in both markets,
completely;
this
is
done
either
by
charging
the
same
price
p
L
H
__
where A 
 = (AL + AH)/2 if AL is large enough, or by simply forsaking the low-value market if
AL is too small. This analysis clearly indicates that the price differential over the two markets
p*H − p*L is smaller when there is peer-induced fairness. This discussion also suggests that the
monopolist should first sell in the high-value market to maximize profit.
B. Executive Compensation
Why are CEO salaries so high? With the attractive executive remuneration packages in practice, the marginal utility gained from the last dollar in a CEO’s pay is likely to be very small.
That is, when the CEO’s utility function u (x) exhibits diminishing marginal utility, the marginal
value of the x-th dollar u′ (x) is very small when x is very large. Since the CEO is not much worse
off without that last dollar, why, then, are CEO salaries so high?
Peer-induced fairness concerns provide a possible explanation. Suppose that CEOs engage in
social comparison with their peers, i.e., other CEOs. In this case, their utility function can be
ˆ − x }, where u(x) is the utility for money as above, and    x
ˆ
modeled as v (x) = u (x) − ρ max { 0,    x
is the average compensation received by the focal set of CEOs. Since individuals are likely
to engage in upward social comparison by selecting individuals who are better as comparison
ˆ > x. Then, the marginal value of the x-th dollar is v′ (x) ≈ ρ, which may
benchmarks, we expect    x
be much higher than zero (when x is large, u′ (x) is negligible). This discussion suggests that CEO
remuneration packages are high not because of their material value, but because of the need to
avoid discomforting social comparison (see also Charness and Peter Kuhn (2004) for theory and
evidence on wage compression and secrecy).
ˆ ) can significantly
Peer-induced fairness also suggests that the reference or focal CEO set (   x
influence this social comparison process. For instance, O’Reilly, Main and Crystal (1988) show
that there is a strong association between CEO compensation and the average compensation level
of outside directors who serve on the compensation committee. This finding can be explained if
CEOs treat members of the compensation committee as their peers.
C. Union Negotiation
In many industries, a large part of the workforce is represented by a nationally organized union
which engages in pattern bargaining with multiple firms (Marshall and Merlo 2004). Pattern bargaining consists of three features. First, the union chooses to negotiate with firms sequentially.
Second, the union chooses the order with which it negotiates with firms. Third, the agreement with
the first firm becomes the reference point that sets the pattern for all subsequent negotiations.
Suppose union U and firm F are negotiating over a pie, the size of which is normalized to one
unit. Both U and F will receive the outside option of zero if they do not come to an agreement.
If they do, let x and 1 − x be the shares of U and F, respectively. Then, by standard analysis, it
follows that for any x ∈ (0, 1), both parties will strictly prefer an agreement. In this case, we have
(0, 1) as the feasible set.
Let the union’s agreement with the first firm be x′ ∈ (0, 1). Now, consider a subsequent
negotiation between the union and another firm. If the union (or its members) exhibit peerinduced fairness concerns, then in the current negotiation, U ’s utility from receiving x will be
x − ρ max { 0, x′ − x}. Observe that the feasible set of this game is now smaller, consisting only
of allocations x ∈ (( ρx′/(1+ρ)), 1) ⊂ (0, 1). That is, pattern bargaining reduces the feasible set
of negotiation outcomes in the interests of the union. In addition, the union has an incentive to
choose an order in which x′ is maximized in the first firm.
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Firms may also exhibit peer-induced fairness and bring to their respective negotiation their
own comparison benchmarks. Let a specific firm’s reference point be x″. In this case, F’s utility
from receiving 1 − x will be 1 − x − ρ max { 0, (x − x″)} . We would expect x′ > x″ since
each party’s “comparable” outcome is likely to be biased in their own favor. For instance, Marc
J. Knez and Camerer (1995) show experimentally that people apply different benchmarks for
comparison when they have different outside options. Linda Babcock, Xianghong Wang, and
Loewenstein (1996) provide empirical evidence for such a self-serving bias in teacher contract
negotiations (see also Anand M. Goel and Anjan V. Thakor (2005) for how optimal contract
design could change as a result of peer-induced fairness effect and Werner Guth et al. (2001)
for a nice discussion on a similar issue). In this case, the feasible set of the game becomes
x ∈ (( ρx′)/(1 + ρ), (1 + ρx″)/(1 + ρ)). In fact, when x′ − x″ > 1/ρ, the feasible set is empty. This
might occur when the two reference points diverge too widely (i.e., the gap x′ − x″ is too large), or
when the degree of peer-induced fairness ρ is large. This could explain why many labor contract
negotiations end up in a strike. In most cases, there had been ample time and opportunities for
interaction between negotiating parties. Peer-induced fairness suggests that an agreement is not
feasible in the first place.

VI. Conclusions

In this paper, we study peer-induced fairness in games. Peer-induced fairness concerns are
prevalent because people have a natural tendency to look to their peers when evaluating their
payoffs. This predisposition toward social comparison closely relates to the notions of conformism (Akerlof 1980; B. Douglas Bernheim 1984) and social influence (Yan Chen et al. 2007). We
examine two distinct kinds of fairness concerns: (i) distributional fairness concerns (relative to
other players in a game) and (ii) peer-induced fairness concerns (relative to one’s peers). Our
work builds on that of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), which posits that economic agents experience a
disutility when they receive a different material payoff compared to another reference agent or
group.
We investigate peer-induced fairness in a sequence of two independent ultimatum games
played by a leader and two followers. The leader plays an ultimatum game with the first follower,
and then the same leader plays the same ultimatum game with the second follower. The games
are independent in that each follower receives material payoff only in their respective game.
Within each ultimatum game, the leader and the corresponding follower exhibit distributional
fairness concerns in that both are averse to receiving less than the other. Between the two games,
there is peer-induced fairness concerns in that the second follower is averse to receiving less than
the first follower. In our model, the second follower does not perfectly observe what the first follower receives, but there is an information collection stage between the two games. That is, after
the first ultimatum game, the second follower observes an imperfect signal of what the first follower is likely to receive before playing the second ultimatum game. We analyze the equilibrium
of this game under imperfect information. Without peer-induced fairness, the second follower’s
acceptance decision and the leader’s offer in the second game should not be influenced by the
signal. In contrast, with peer-induced fairness, our model predicts that the second follower’s
behavior will be influenced by her inference of the first follower’s payoff, and that the leader will
align the second offer with the second follower’s inference.
We test our model predictions experimentally. Subjects are randomly assigned the roles of leader
and followers and are motivated by financial incentives. We find strong support for our model predictions. Specifically, the second follower’s rate of rejection increases with the difference between
the second offer and her inference of the first follower’s payoff. Also, the leader aligns the second
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offer close to the inference of the first follower’s payoff in order to avoid rejection by the second
follower. In combination, these results strongly suggest the existence of peer-induced fairness. We
also structurally estimate our model using the experimental data. Our estimation results show that
peer-induced fairness is distinct from distributional fairness, and the former is crucial in explaining
subjects’ behavior. The parameter estimates suggest that the second follower has a preference for
peer-induced fairness that is two times stronger than her preference for distributional fairness (i.e.,
the former weighs more heavily in the second follower’s decision).
We extend the basic model by allowing a fraction of the subjects to be purely self-interested.
Our structural estimation results indicate that about half of the subjects are purely self-interested
while the other half exhibit fairness concerns. This result suggests that it is important to incorporate heterogeneity in the strategic analysis of games. Finally, we show how peer-induced fairness
plays a key role in several economic applications. For example, peer-induced fairness can restrict
a monopoly’s ability to price discriminate, account for the low variability in CEO compensation,
and lead to the occurrence of labor strikes.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
The leader faces two alternatives. First, he may offer zero, which induces the follower to reject,
and this leaves the leader with zero utility. Second, he may choose the optimal offer, among all
the offers that are acceptable to the second follower. In other words, the leader solves the following problem:
maxs2	

UL,II  (s2, 1 | z)
UF2 (s2, 1 | z) ≥ 0.

s.t.
Note that this problem is equivalent to
mins2	

s2
UF2 (s2, 1 | z) ≥ 0,

s.t.

since the leader’s utility UL,II (s2, 1 | z) always increases as s2 decreases. Introducing the variables
ˆ1 − s2, 0}, we obtain the following problem. Denote the
w1 = max {π − 2s2, 0} and w2 = max{   s
solution by s20 :
mins2,w1,w2	
s.t.

s2
ˆ w2 ≥ 0
s2 − δ w1 − ρ    p

		

w1 ≥ π − 2s2

		

w2 ≥   s
 ˆ1 − s2

		

w1, w2 ≥ 0.

Notice that the feasible region above can be expressed in terms of only s2 to yield
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s2
ˆ1 − s2) ≥ 0
ˆ (   s
s2 − δ(π − 2s2) − ρ     p
s2 − δ(π − 2s2) ≥ 0
ˆ (  s
 ˆ1 − s2) ≥ 0
s2 − ρ     p

ˆ1
ˆ   s
πδ + ρ     p 
⇔ s2 ≥ __________
 
   
ˆ
1 + 2δ + ρ     p

⇔ s2 ≥ ______
  πδ  
1 + 2δ

ˆ1
ˆ   s
ρ     p 
⇔ s2 ≥ ______
 
 
ˆ
1 + ρ     p

s2 ≥ 0.
Therefore, among all the offers that are acceptable to the second follower, the offer that maximizes the leader’s utility UL,II (s2, a2 | z) is
ˆ1 , _____
ˆ1 ,
ˆ   s
ˆ   s
πδ + ρ     p 
ρ     p 
πδ  , __________
______
s 02  = max e 
 
  
  0f .
  ˆ     
ˆ
1 + 2δ 1 + 2δ + ρ   p 1+ρ     p
Next, notice that the offer s12 that leaves the leader with zero utility is
π(1 + δ)
s 12   = π − ______
  πδ   = _______
 
  .
1 + 2δ
1 + 2δ
Finally, we see that the leader’s equilibrium offer in the second game must be min{s02 ,  s 12   }, as
given in the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Consider two possible offers s1 and s′1 =s1 + k with k > 0. Under the same noise term ε, the
signal realizations are z = s1 + ε and z′ = s′1 + ε in the two cases. Note that they differ by k
exactly. Given the same noise term ε, the posterior distribution H′ of the first offer under true
offer s′1 is thus a translation (to the right) of the posterior distribution H of the first offer under
ˆ1 denote the inferences corresponding to true offer s1, and let    p
ˆ1′ denote
ˆ ,    s
ˆ ′,    s
true offer s1. Let    p
ˆ+
the inferences corresponding to true offer s′1, under some fixed noise term ε. Note that   p
 ˆ ′ =    p
  ˆ
  ˆ
kh(A) + o(k) and s
  1′ = s
  1 + k + kAh(A) + o(k). Recall A = (δπ)/(1 + 2δ) is the first follower’s
acceptance threshold.
ˆ ′,   s
To prove our result, we shall show that the equilibrium second offer satisfies s*2 (     p
 ˆ1′  ) ≥
  ˆ   ˆ
*
s 2 (   p,  s1). From Proposition 1, considering each individual term separately, it suffices to show
ˆ1′ )/(1 + 2δ + ρ     p
ˆ1 )/(1 + 2δ + ρ     p
ˆ ′   s
ˆ ′ ) ≥ (πδ + ρ     p 
ˆ   s
ˆ ) and (ρ     p
ˆ ′  s
ˆ′ ) ≥
(πδ + ρ     p
 ˆ1′ )/(1 + ρ     p
  ˆ   ˆ
  ˆ
(ρ   p s1 )/(1 + ρ   p).
For the first inequality above, we need to show
ˆ1 + k + kAh(a))][1 + 2δ + ρ     p
ˆ1][1 + 2δ + ρ(    p
ˆ ] ≥ [πδ + ρ     p 
ˆ   s
ˆ + kh(A))].
[πδ + ρ(   p
 ˆ + kh(A))(   s
ˆ1(1 + 2δ + ρ     p
ˆ1)ρkh(A), since   s
ˆ ) ≥ (πδ +ρ     p 
ˆ   s
This inequality holds because we have ρkh(A)   s
 ˆ1 ≥
(δπ)/(1 + 2δ) as the first follower’s acceptance threshold is A = (δπ)/(1 + 2δ). For the second
inequality above, we need to show
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ˆ1 + k + kAh(A)][1 + ρ     p
ˆ1[1 + ρ(     p
ˆ + kh(A)][   s
ˆ ] ≥ ρ     p 
ˆ   s
ˆ + kh(A))].
ρ[      p
ˆ1 kh(A) but the
ˆ   s
ˆ ) by ρ 2  p 
This inequality holds because the right-hand side exceeds ρ     p
 ˆ1(1 + ρ     p
 ˆ   s
left-hand side exceeds by more.
Therefore, we have shown that for each noise term ε, the equilibrium second offer is larger
when the first offer is s1′ compared to s1. The lemma thus follows.
Proof of Proposition 3:
By Lemma 2, we know that EU  *L,II (s1) is decreasing in s1. Also, note that U  *L,II (z) ≤
UL,I  ((πδ)/(1 + 2δ), 1). This holds because for any z, U  *L,II (z) = UL,II (s*2 (z), a*2 (z) | z) ≤
UL,II    ((πδ)/(1 + 2δ), 1 |z) ≤ UL,I ((πδ)/(1 + 2δ), 1).
Now, we evaluate the two alternatives facing the leader: offer zero (and the first follower
rejects) or offer the optimal acceptable offer (and the follower accepts). Recall that the leader
wishes to maximize UL,I  (s1, a1) + EU  *L,II (s1). When the leader offers zero to the first follower, the first term is zero and the second term is at most UL,I ((πδ)/(1 + 2δ), 1). Alternatively,
the leader may make an offer that is acceptable to the first follower. Recall that only offers
s1 ≥ A = (πδ)/(1 + 2δ) are acceptable. Since both UL,I (s1, a1) and EU  *L,II (s1) are decreasing
in s1, the leader’s optimal offer that is acceptable to the follower is s1 = (πδ)/(1 + 2δ). In this
case, the first term is UL,I ((πδ)/(1 + 2δ), 1) and the second term is nonnegative. The proposition thus follows.
Proof of Corollary 4:
This follows from comparing the results in Propositions 1 and 3.
Proof of Proposition 5:
˜ 2 is the minimum offer that is acceptable to the type with fairness concerns.
It is clear that    s
˜2, 1), or (ii) offer 0 and receive π with probThe leader may either: (i) offer   s
 ˜2 and receive UL,II (   s
ability θ and 0 with probability 1 − θ (i.e., the expected utility is θπ). The leader thus chooses the
better alternative, as characterized in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Recall that the leader wishes to maximize UL,I (s1, a1) + UL,II (s2, a2), where a1 and a2 now
refers to the acceptance decisions of the fair-minded types. Note from Proposition 5 that along
˜2, 1), UL,II (0,0)} = max {UL,II (   s
˜2, 1), θπ}.
the equilibrium path, we have U  *L,II (s2, a2 ) = max {UL,II (   s
Thus the reasoning in the proof of Lemma 2 continues to apply to the first term, and thus Lemma
2 holds. Therefore, the only candidates for the first offer s1 are 0 and (π δ)/(1 + 2 δ). We will
analyze the increase in the leader’s utility when he offers s1 = 0, compared to when he offers s1
= (π δ)/(1 + 2 δ); in this proof, we term this his incremental utility.
In Game I, the leader’s utility from offering (π δ)/(1 + 2 δ) does not depend on θ; however, the
leader’s utility from offering 0, which is θπ, has derivative π with respect to θ.
Next, consider the leader’s incremental utility from Game II along the equilibrium path. When
˜2, 1 ∣ s1 = 0), θπ}. When s1 = (π δ)/(1 + 2 δ), the leader’s
s1 = 0, the leader’s utility is max {UL,II (   s
˜2, 1 | s1 = (π δ)/(1 + 2 δ)), θπ}. In both cases, the first term does not depend
utility is max {UL,II (   s
on θ and the second term has derivative π with respect to θ. Therefore, the derivative of the incremental utility (i.e. the difference) with respect to θ must be at least −π.
Combining the two games, the derivative of the incremental utility with respect to θ must be
nonnegative. In other words, as θ increases, offering s1 = 0 always becomes more attractive. The
proposition thus follows.
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Appendix B: Instructions
This is an experiment in economic decision making. The instructions are simple and if you
follow them carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable amount of money
which will be paid to you in cash before you leave today. Different subjects may earn different
amounts of cash. What you earn today depends partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions
of others, and partly on chance.
The experiment consists of 24 decision-making rounds. There are 21 subjects in this room. In
each round, we will randomly group you into seven triplets. In each round and in each triplet,
one subject will be a RED player and two subjects will be BLUE players (BLUE1 and BLUE2).
You have an equal chance of playing the role of RED, BLUE1, or BLUE2 in each round. The
decision-making task of each player will be explained below.
It is important that you do not look at the decisions of others, and that you do not talk, laugh ,or
exclaim aloud during the experiment. You will be warned if you violate this rule the first time. If
you violate this rule a second time, you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. That is,
your total earnings will be zero.
Experimental procedure
In each round, the decision making task occurs in three stages, namely, I, II, and III. Each
RED player and the two matched BLUE players (BLUE1 and BLUE2) undertake the task as follows. Again the assignment of your role is determined randomly so that each person in the triplet
has an equal chance of playing RED, BLUE1, or BLUE2.
In Stage I, RED and BLUE1 will have a pot of 100 points to divide between them (BLUE2 will
sit still in this stage). RED will make an offer of OFFER1 (ranging from 0 to 100 points) to give
to BLUE1. After receiving OFFER1, BLUE1 must decide whether or not to accept it. If BLUE1
accepts the offer, RED will receive 100–OFFER1 points and BLUE1 will receive OFFER1
points. However, if BLUE1 rejects the offer, both RED and BLUE1 will receive nothing in that
decision-making round. Note that the outcome of Stage I (i.e., whether BLUE1 accepts the offer)
will be revealed to RED only at the end of Stage III.
In Stage II, we randomly draw a number from a set of 5 numbers: {−20, −10, 0, 10, 20}. That
is, each number has an equal chance of being drawn. We call the drawn number X. We generate
a signal called SIGNAL1 by adding X to OFFER1. We will use the number SIGNAL1 in Stage
III. Note that each triplet involves a different independent draw in each decision round. However,
each draw is always from the same set consisting of the same five numbers.
Let’s consider two examples to see how this signal generation process works. If SIGNAL1
= 30, then there are five possible scenarios:
Offer 1

X

Signal 1

50

−20

30

40

−10

30

30

0

30

20

10

30

10

20

30

Note that if SIGNAL1 = 30, OFFER1 can range from 10 to 50 depending on the value of the
random number X.
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Similarly, if SIGNAL1 = 70, we have the following five possible scenarios:
Offer 1

X

Signal 1

90

−20

70

80

−10

70

70

0

70

60

10

70

50

20

70

That is, OFFER1 can range from 50 to 90. Note that the two examples above are chosen purely
for illustration purposes. In no way, the shown values are indicative of the optimal choices.
BLUE2 will guess what OFFER1 is. If BLUE2 guesses correctly, he or she will receive a total
of ten points. If BLUE2 guess wrongly, he or she will receive nothing. Note that BLUE2’s guess,
and whether it is correct, will be revealed to RED and BLUE2 only at the end of Stage III.
In Stage III, RED and BLUE2 will have a pot of 100 points to divide between them (i.e.,
BLUE1 will sit still). Before RED makes her offer, both RED and BLUE2 will be informed of
the value of SIGNAL1. Note that SIGNAL1 is generated by adding the random draw X described
in Stage II to the OFFER1 made by RED to BLUE1 in Stage I. Then, RED will make OFFER2
(ranging from 0 to 100 points) to give it to BLUE2. After receiving OFFER2, BLUE2 must
decide whether to accept the offer. If BLUE2 accepts the offer, RED will receive 100–OFFER2
points and BLUE2 will receive OFFER2 points. However, if BLUE2 rejects the offer, both RED
and BLUE2 will receive nothing in that decision round.
At the end of Stage III, the RED and both BLUE subjects will be informed of their respective
decision outcomes and point earnings. This decision task is repeated for 24 times. In each round,
seven triplets will be formed. Each player in the triplet will have an equal chance playing RED,
BLUE1, or BLUE2.
Payoffs
Your dollar earnings for the experiments are determined as follows. First, we will sum up your
total point earnings from all 24 rounds. Then we will multiply your point earnings by 0.01. This
is the amount you will be paid when you leave the experiment. Note that the more points you
earn, the more money you will receive.
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